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Post 19. Paul Linden Retek: ‘Safe third countries’ and our
obligations to others

Afghan citizens pack inside a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III, as they are transported from
Hamid Karzai International Airport in Afghanistan, on Aug. 15, 2021. Photograph courtesy of
Capt. Chris Herbert/U.S. Air Force via AP.
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Introduction: The devastating images of chaos and suffering in Afghanistan have left an indelible
mark on citizens and policy-makers in the West. They have made the evacuation of those
Afghans who served alongside U.S. and European militaries a moral obligation—and raised the
question whether that obligation must extend, as well, to any and all Afghans who are imperiled
by the return of Taliban rule.
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The devastating images of chaos and suffering in Afghanistan have left an indelible mark on
citizens and policy-makers in the West. They have made the evacuation of those Afghans who
served alongside U.S. and European militaries a moral obligation—and raised the question
whether that obligation must extend, as well, to any and all Afghans who are imperiled by the
return of Taliban rule.
The pledge that many countries—Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, among
them—will resettle tens of thousands of Afghan refugees is a positive development. But it is only
a beginning—and not solely in the sense that these quotas remain far too conservative and that
many more Afghans can build a home with us, safely and fairly. These policies are a beginning,
too, in that we must think carefully about how to sustain such moral commitments over time.
In today’s political climate, the commitment of states to their obligations under international
refugee law is a fragile, often fleeting affair. French President Emmanuel Macron, while
expressing solidarity with Afghans, immediately added that Europe must protect itself against
‘major irregular migratory flows’. The leader of Germany’s Christian Democrats tweeted that
Germany must not repeat 2015, when the country opened its borders to Syrian refugees.
If the recent history of mass migration is a guide, we will see states, particularly those in the
Global North, enact policies designed to control and to impede the free movement of refugees
seeking safety. Some will be plain to see: the construction of border walls, the interdiction of
ships at sea. Many of these efforts will be illegal. They will violate key provisions of the 1951
Refugee Convention and its codifications in domestic law—most prominently the principle of
‘non-refoulement’, one of international human rights law’s most sacred principles that prohibits
states from returning anyone to where they will face danger of persecution.
Some of these actions, however, will have the cover of law. Not only will they appear to pass
international legal muster; they will make active use of specific, long-standing legal concepts in
refugee law itself to effectuate their goals of preventing refugees’ free movement. Among them
is the so-called ‘safe third country’ (STC) concept.
The concept’s fundamental assumption is that certain asylum seekers may be returned, without
full scrutiny of their asylum request, to third countries if those states can be considered safe. It
first emerged from the conviction that the uneven distribution of asylum seekers across the
European Union was due to ‘forum shopping’ by applicants, who chose to travel to the Member
State they perceived as more sympathetic to their plight. The principle has a number of
applications and uses: as a filter for the admissibility of asylum claims and in some cases as a
basis for exclusion from refugee status at the merits phase of proceedings; and as a justification
for blocking the passage of refugees in transit or for summarily returning those who have
reached national territory before they file a claim to protection.

Scholars of the concept have focused their attention principally on the conditions under which
STC transfers lawfully accord with the 1951 Convention’s guarantees of effective protection of
individual rights. Many have pointed to the difficulties of securing such guarantees on the
ground and have warned that the ‘safe third country’ concept is often unworkable in practice.
Only a few studies have addressed the lawfulness of the concept itself from a refugee law and
human rights perspective, and this without reaching a definite conclusion—and not discounting
the legality of the STC idea itself.
In my recent work, I examine the effects of STC rules in the European Union (through the
Dublin Regulation and in arrangements with Turkey) and in bilateral asylum cooperation
agreements between the United States and Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. I
offer a new analytic frame. I reconceive the nature of the fundamental harm at stake in the ‘safe
third country’ concept as a violation not, in the first instance, of the effective protection of
individual human rights but instead of the principle of democratic responsibility. The key wrong
is better conceptualized as a relational and distributive harm before it is felt as an individual
one. It is relational in that it distorts the character of the relationship between the removing state
and the individual refugee. And it is distributive in that it unfairly maldistributes responsibilities
among states for the protection of refugee rights. My argument does not deny that individual
rights violations do indeed come as effects of that core harm. But as effects, they do not yet
reveal the most vital dynamics of the concept—and why, even should its applications be made to
satisfy individual rights minima, the ‘safe third country’ concept would remain immoral and
unlawful.
Focusing on individual rights protection alone is too passive a mode of legal critique—and, as I
argue, inadequately reflects important doctrinal innovations in international human rights law.
New conceptions of ‘functional jurisdiction’, for example, that emphasize creative, evolving
theories of effective control and the duty to prevent harm are usefully understood as relational
concepts. Democratic responsibility also makes clearer sense of why performance of treaty
obligations in good faith requires the fair distribution of burdens. The core illegality of the safe
third country concept lies in the manner it insulates the state from accountability in its relations
with the refugee and the foreigner alike.
Consider how STC rules can entail subtle but consequential shifts in the burdens and standards
of proof required of refugees seeking asylum. Under the Trump Administration’s modification to
asylum procedures in the United States, applicants who traveled through safe third countries
were automatically subject to withholding of removal proceedings, which demand a higher
standard of proof for establishing fear of persecution than do petitions for asylum and disregard
any justification for the refugee’s secondary movement. These shifts alter the dispositions of the
questions asked and the testimony required—and in so doing change the nature of what the state
hears. They displace in their own ways the applicant’s agency: they fragment the integrity of the
story a refugee can wish to tell, make it more difficult to understand how trauma can inform
inconsistencies in that story, and thus prevent a responsive judgment on the merits of the claim to
protection.

Seeing these broader dimensions of asylum law matters deeply. The language of rights can often
appear too narrow. But we should find more in human rights and affirm, indeed, what those who
assert rights for themselves have long known: that while a rights claim might seek redress for an
individual harm, it also indicts the relations of recognition, power, and material distribution that
make this harm possible.
All of this suggests that the normative horizon of international human rights law is not exhausted
by the protection of the individual. The rights of refugees defend not only those who seek
asylum—they also promise to restore concerns about equality and fairness to our sense of the
world. Today, and in the months ahead, we should not close our eyes to them.
Please see the Boston Review article, Whose Suffering Matters', by Dr. Paul Linden-Retek, 'here.

